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6.1  Introduction 
Populism is a form of political conduct, adopted by a person or a group of 
people, that may be identified by  the use of economic tools and other means 
designed to produce favorable results quickly, regardless of how  short-lived 
they may be, in so much as these actions are instrumental to acquire and main- 
tain authoritarian power. 
Under this definition it can be said that, while populism is less than a polit- 
ical system proper, it nevertheless represents more than mere demagoguery. 
Populism is in fact more than just political promises; the populist leader will 
actually try to deliver them. There are two words key to understanding popu- 
lism: instability and discontent. Let us begin with the former. When the polit- 
ical system qualifies as a stable one, there is hardly any room for populism. 
Whether democratic or autocratic, a stable political system will tend to restrict 
populist behavior. That is why one cannot rightly refer to occasional dema- 
gogic actions of a politician in a consolidated democracy as populism. These 
activities would lack the systematic character of  populist conduct. 
It might also be confusing to refer to socialist dictatorships as populist, not 
only because the ruling party is firmly entrenched in power but also because 
most of their social and economic policies are not designed for immediate 
results but, on the contrary, only envisage an ‘‘officially determined long run.” 
It is political (and economic) instability that creates the right momentum for 
the populist appeal. The political system must be  vulnerable and fragile to 
provide a basis for the growth and expansion of populism. 
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The other element is discontent.  Very  quick social transformations  are a 
sure source of discontent, as is a fairly long period  of stagnation.  Further- 
more, unequal  wealth and income distribution also play  an important role, 
especially if accumulation is understood to have taken place at the expense of 
the majority of the people. 
One may argue, however, that if discontent could be channeled through a 
democratic representation there would be hardly any room left for populism. 
Discontent  without  representation  tends  to  generate  disenchantment,  and 
people become more vulnerable to a solution in the realm of magic. Populism 
is a way of bringing back hope for those who feel misrepresented in  society. 
Thus populism is fostered with more ingredients than just the manipulation of 
economic tools. 
There  is  clearly  a  political  relationship  between  the  populist  ruler,  his 
group, and their represented sectors, thereby establishing an alternative legit- 
imacy to his (or their) authoritarian deeds. So populism is not just demagogu- 
ery. It  is rather  political  activism  in  search of  power.  This is precisely  the 
ultimate characteristic  of populism-the  struggle on the part of  the activist 
group to  acquire and  maintain  more power.  Given political  instability  as a 
prerequisite,  populism  is  not  compatible  with  democracy;  every  political 
blank must be filled by the populist in search of consolidating his own author- 
ity (or that of his group) and not the authority of the democratic regime itself. 
In essence, every populist draws on authoritarianism. Nevertheless, in its cur- 
rent practice, populism may show itself in the form of  numerous middle-of- 
the-road situations that defy the analytical spirit of an attentive observer. 
Despite the obvious difficulties of determining a more generic or universal 
definition  for the  phenomenon, a case-by-case  study of  populism  only  be- 
comes meaningful if  the theoretical concept of  populism is previously estab- 
lished. In that sense, the mere detection of the wrong economic policies does 
not qualify those policies as a story of populism; on the other hand, there are 
quite a few experiences of populism that have achieved fairly good success for 
quite some time before their structural misdoings finally showed up. 
The political elements of discontent and instability are the key factors that 
seem to be at the core of populism, for which reason the aspects of  power 
struggle and domination  tend to offset the contours of  an “economic” popu- 
lism so defined.  Otherwise  the economist’s  view  of  an essentially political 
phenomenon may end up dragging him to the extreme of labeling every failed 
growth policy  or distributive  action  as populist.  In other words,  not every 
dictator is a populist  and, surely, not every populist is a dictator; however, 
every authoritarian ruler does lean toward populism whenever challenged by 
political instability. On the other hand, not every distributive or  income policy 
has to be a populist one, although there is no populism without  actions de- 
signed to placate discontent. 
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undertake populist actions because of social pressures.  According to the pre- 
vailing approach, unequal income distribution and widespread poverty press 
politicians toward emphasizing growth and income distribution with no regard 
to other restrictions, such as inflation,  deficit  finance,  and balance of  pay- 
ments equilibrium (see e.g., Sachs 1989 and Dornbusch and Edwards 1989). 
Accordingly, politicians  are basically  naive in their purposes or, worse yet, 
they are “victims” of circumstance. The opposite view argues that the populist 
leader carries out careful political calculations for each of his actions and uses 
economic policies as a means to reach his objectives. Besides, depending on 
the brand of  populism, populist policies do not necessarily end up thorough 
failures. 
In the remaining sections of  this paper we will go over the contemporary 
history of Brazil for the past 60 years and try to frame populism as a form of 
political conduct. Economic tools used in those periods will be pointed out, 
and their economic consequences will be briefly discussed.  In so doing, our 
main task will be to try to validate our tentative definition of the term “popu- 
lism” in light of the recent Brazilian experience. 
6.2  Revisiting Vargas: Classic Populism, 1930-54 
The contribution of Getulio Dornelles Vargas to the consolidation of  a pop- 
ulist  tradition  in Brazilian politics cannot by any means be underestimated. 
Vargas’s political conduct represents what one would call a classic approach 
to the use of economic and noneconomic tools to produce the best results for 
the acquisition and maintenance of authoritarian power. Vargas was a dictator 
for eight years (1937-45)  but that is not what makes him a classic populist. It 
is rather the manipulation  of  power mechanisms in order to influence public 
opinion in favor of his centralizing authority that qualifies his entire period as 
a populist one. 
Vargas had  been a discreet and rather orthodox minister of finance in the 
late  1920s, serving  dutifully under the man  he  eventually  overthrew  from 
power at the turn of  the decade. The 1930 revolution brings the voice of  the 
people into the political scene for the first time in contemporary Brazil. There 
was enough discontent among the emerging proletariat  by  1930 to create a 
demand for a popular leader. People were tired of  the Republican aristocrats 
from the states of Minas Gerais and Siio Paul0 who had been alternating power 
since the overthrow of the emperor in 1889. Political instability completed the 
scene. The 1930 revolution had broken up the old regime and brought forward 
a group of “young lieutenants”-mostly  military-that  lined up in favor of  a 
new protectionist rule to promote domestic industries and to foster the urban- 
ization of a then vastly rural Brazil (70% of the people in the fields as com- 
pared to 30% in the cities by 1930). 
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economics clearly demonstrates that classic populism does not go overboard 
in terms of  short-run economic policy. In other words, the classic populist is 
the one who indeed knows that the economy has to be run under a budget 
constraint and that it has a hard currency reserve limit to compel it back to- 
ward its own boundaries. That was absolutely perceived by Vargas, he himself 
having once been a finance minister. 
During his first period in power (1930-45),  Vargas had to cope with huge 
political and economic pressures. After a brief period as provisional presi- 
dent, Vargas was elected for a 1934-38  term. He had to fight a counterrevo- 
lution in  1932, beating the paulisras but placating them with a protectionist 
industrial policy. Worldwide, the Great Depression incubated fascism and Na- 
zism. Meanwhile, communism was on its way  up. Inside Brazilian borders, 
the new regime made its first attempts to crack up the political bones of  the 
coffee-growing aristocracy-a  task  made  easy  by  the  collapse of  coffee 
prices-and,  at the same time, the new regime stretched itself to manage the 
unmanageable by standing in the middle of integrulistus (the domestic version 
of fascism) and comunistus. 
Vargas led a coup on 10 November 1937, closing the Congress and impos- 
ing himself as ruler. He dressed up his actions with a lot of grandiose designs 
that were summarized by the expression “Estado NBvo,” or “the new state.” A 
new  constitution was written under the influence of  the powerful Francisco 
Campos, who promoted a totalitarian and nationalistic philosophy for Brazil. 
According to him, “centuries of experience have demonstrated that the prin- 
ciple of liberty did not improve the lot of the average citizen or keep the strong 
from taking advantage of the weak. Only a strong state can guarantee to the 
individual the rights he ought to have” (Dulles 1967, pp. 174-75).  Under the 
1937 constitution, the nationalization of mines, sources of energy, banks, in- 
surance companies, and basic and essential industries were to be regulated 
by law. 
On the external front, the Great Depression (1929) hit the country hard, as 
the price of  coffee, the main export, fell sharply. Vargas’s government reacted 
buying part of the coffee production and so avoiding the reduction of domestic 
demand (see Skidmore 1976, p. 66, and Furtado 1976). All servicing of for- 
eign debts was suspended. With regard to the exchange policy, official deval- 
uations more than offset the rate of  increase of  prices in  Brazil until  1939, 
while it did not change much during the Second World War, even though infla- 
tion in  Brazil was greater than in North America. The overvaluation of  the 
exchange during the war made up for the real devaluation of  the previous 
decade (Goldsmith 1986, pp. 186-89). 
The monetary policy was, in general, loose in  1932-37  (with a brief con- 
traction in  1933), which pushed the recovery of the economy after 1932. The 
inflation rate was relatively low, around 10% a year. After 1941, the money 
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The war experience showed the need for an  active monetary policy, which 
resulted in the creation of SUMOC in 1945, an embryo of the Central Bank.’ 
In  his first period in power, Vargas also laid down the foundations of the 
interventionist model. In  1933, the Brazilian Coffee Institute (IBC) was cre- 
ated and would dominate all the coffee matters in Brazil for the next 55 years. 
A similar organization-Instituto  do Acucar e do Alcool (1AA)-was  set to 
prevail over the sugar industry, from production to final marketing. The Min- 
istry of  Finance, under Artur de Souza Costa began to articulate the centrali- 
zation  of  policy-making in  Brazil.  In the early  1930s, the Social Security 
Institutes were created to offer medical assistance and welfare protection (old- 
age retirement and pensions) to the working classes. All were under federal 
control. The government also gave incentives to the formation of  workers’ 
unions, provided that they were approved under the newly installed Ministry 
of Labor, headed by the articulate and dynamic Lindolpho Collor, grandfather 
of Fernando Collor de Melo, now president of Brazil. 
Vargas stood in power until 1945 when World War I1 was over. By then, the 
foundations of a strong and pervasive state had already been laid down. After 
an  interim presidency (by Vargas’s  former Minister Eurico Dutra) between 
1946 and 1949, the former dictator came back to power as a democratically 
elected president in 1950. It goes to show that a classical populist’s political 
platform is often long-lasting. 
During his second period in  power (195 1-54),  Vargas tried to achieve an 
impossible balance between the external restriction, inflation, and his invest- 
ment strategy. He sought to work under the rules of the international system 
and accepted foreign collaboration to finance his investment plan (e.g., the 
Brazil-USA commission of  1951-53).  In  1953, he  adopted a more flexible 
exchange rate policy. These gestures helped to convince foreign investors and 
international institutions that he was prepared  to keep a policy of  external 
balance.2 On the other hand, Vargas appealed frequently to the people’s na- 
tionalistic and  xenophobic  sentiments and  channeled investments through 
state companies in order to satisfy the opposition (Skidmore 1976, p.  128). 
At  the end of  1952, the balance of  payments situation and inflation had be- 
come critical. Vargas again showed understanding of the limits of his pop- 
lism. In August 1954, he reshuffled his cabinet and adopted a quite orthodox 
stabilization program under the supervision of one of  his most competent col- 
laborators, Oswaldo Aranha.3 The plan was not carried out by Aranha himself 
because of a political crisis that came to an end with Vargas’s suicide. 
I. For an account of  the monetary policy in the period 1930-45, see Neuhaus (1975, pp.  128- 
2. See Skidmore (1976, p. 124). For an account of  the exchange rate policy, see Goldsmith 
3. See Skidmore { 1976, p. 15 1). The Aranha stabilization program would be put into effect by 
29). 
(1986, p. 251). 
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Vargas committed  suicide in the midst of  a sea of accusations against his 
government’s moral  conduct. That last  gesture  was to give him  a political 
afterlife for another  10 years. Vargas’s farewell message, written right before 
he put  a bullet  through  his  heart, contains  all  the vital  elements of classic 
populism in Brazil: 
Domination and plunder on the part of  international and financial groups, 
. . . The excess-profits law  was held up by  Congress, . . . Hatreds  . . . 
against the just revision of minimum wages.  . . . National freedom . . . by 
means of Petrobras, . . . Electrobras was obstructed; . . .  They do not want 
the worker to be free; . . . Profits of  foreign companies were reaching  as 
much as 500 percent per annum; . . . Came the coffee crisis . . . we tried 
to defend its price and the reply was such violent pressure.  . . . I fought 
against the spoliation of Brazil.  . . . Now I offer my death. (Dulles 1967, 
pp. 334-35) 
For the entire 15-year period of his first term-as  provisional and constitu- 
tional president and then as a dictator, from 1930 to 1945-and  again during 
the short period of his second and last term as elected president from 1950 to 
1954, Vargas never disregarded the aspect of short-run macroeconomic equi- 
librium as it can be shown by the average data related to those periods. As we 
can see in the table 6.1, real gross domestic product (GDP) grew an average 
of  4.4% a year in the first of  Vargas’s periods and 6% in his second period; 
these are good records, particularly  if  we bear in mind that during his first 
period  he had to maneuver the economy through a world  recession,  a civil 
war, and, then, a world war. As regard to inflation, the average price increase 
was 6.7% a year in Vargas’s first period and 17% a year in his second period. 
External accounts were in surplus in his first period and experienced a deterio- 
Table 6.1  Main Macroeconomic Indicators of the Brazilian Economy (Average Values 
of the Period) 
Stages of  Populism 
Money 
Real  Nominal  Trade  Current 
GDP  Wages  Inflation  MI  M2  Balance  Account 
(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) 
Vargas’s first term (193145) 
Vargas’s second term (1951-54) 
Kubitschek (1956-60) 
Goulart (1961-63) 
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Sources: See appendix A. 
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ration in his second term in office. Vargas had been trying to cope with infla- 
tion and external imbalances in 1954 when he was cut off by a political crisis 
which  ended in tragedy.  Nevertheless,  he  was a downright populist  in  the 
sense of using noneconomic tools to his best advantage and in order to achieve 
and maintain some kind of authoritarian power. Such tools would finally in- 
clude his own death as a last resort. 
The lessons to be drawn from the Vargas period help to clarify the intersec- 
tion between populism and economics. First of all, the populist’s mind has the 
unavoidable tendency to promote the centralization of  economic power. That, 
in turn, leads the economy toward nationalization and excessive regulation of 
private activities. In fact, it was Vargas who laid down the foundations for all 
the subsequent  expansion  of  the  state as an entrepreneur:  Petrobris, Elec- 
trobras,  the  steel  corporations  (several  of  them,  starting  with  Companhia 
Siderurgica  Nacional),  the  mining  company  Vale  do Rio Doce-all  these 
giants,  that  would  later reproduce  themselves  into many  other companies, 
were created under Vargas’s inspiration.4 
Those huge corporations  implied the establishment of  a complex network 
of  private  interests  that  permeated  the  whole economy.  The private  sector 
under the public corporations’ umbrella would incorporate their motto in fa- 
vor of permanent government control. That, in turn, would determine the of- 
ficial manipulation of the so-called strategic prices, thus persuading the public 
to believe  the  fallacy  that “important”  prices,  like those of  gas, oil, steel, 
sugar and wheat, could not be set up under market conditions. 
Such a heritage of economic interventionism is absolutely more relevant in 
explaining  the Brazilian  populist  experience  than the occasional propensity 
toward inflationary policies or the balance of payments crises. The structural 
distortions generated by outright intervention and excessive regulation would 
eventually provoke stagflation in the late  1970s and throughout the  1980s. 
Nevertheless,  that only came along after a fairly long period of  time. In the 
meantime,  the apparent results seemed to be quite favorable because of the 
effects of centralized economic decision making. 
The second important heritage of populism that comes with nationalization 
and regulation  is what  we may  call institutional  underdevelopment.  It may 
sound like a paradox that such extensive centralization of decision making and 
the multiplication of  government agencies to control the economy would not 
entail the development of sound institutions that are characteristic of  liberal 
democratic countries. The explanation for that apparent paradox can be found 
in the authoritarian nature of  populism,  and that is precisely  why there is no 
such a thing as democratic populism.  The search for power and the struggle 
to keep it under a populist rule produces the disruption of traditions that is so 
important in forming the nature of public institutions and agencies. In other 
4.  For an  account of Vargas’s  interventionist policies during the period 1930-45,  see Skidrnore 
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words, under populism such institutions and agencies exist to serve the ruler’s 
intentions and not the other way around. 
Take, for instance, the Central Bank. The idea of creating an independent 
Central Bank in Brazil dates back to the  1920s. In the late 1930s, the U.S. 
government tried  to influence Brazil in the same direction,  by  conditioning 
certain refinancing clauses of the country’s external debts to such institutional 
developments sought by the Brazilian negotiator,  Oswaldo Aranha.  It was a 
useless attempt. The Brazilian Central Reserve Bank was never established 
(see Dulles  1967, pp.  203-4).  At the end of the Second World War,  as the 
inflationary pressures increased, a governmental agency, SUMOC, was set up 
to control the monetary policy; however, it had limited powers. Vargas under- 
stood well the need for an independent Central Bank to fight inflation, but he 
could not go so far as to create one because it would limit his powers. A third 
attempt was to be carried out in the 1960s, but the result was another failure. 
Summing up, Brazil owes to populism much of its best and worst moments 
when we look into the subsequent acts of its recent history. Classic populism 
was pretty  abiding to the limits of fiscal and external budgets,  and one can 
even  praise  its  first  movements  in  terms of  centralizing  economic  power, 
which did fulfil a vacuum of  decision making in a historical period when every 
nation was fighting the Depression, then coping with a world war, and finally 
recovering  from the war effects under the prevailing  academic tutorship of 
Lord Keynes and his followers, who, by all means, advocated a widening of 
government’s  intervention  in  the  economy.  In  that  sense, populism  in  the 
1930s, all the way through the  1950s, was a very clever political  adaptation 
of some less-developed countries to the current tides of that time. The sequels 
thereof have to be understood in that perspective. 
6.3  Three Decades between Conservatives and Populists: 1954-84 
In the 30 years’ time that elapsed from Vargas’s death (24 August  1954) to 
the return of a civilian rule (15 November 1984), Brazil has oscillated between 
populism  and conservatism,  and has sometimes experienced an inextricable 
mix of both. The main trend, however, can be said to have remained a populist 
one, basically faithful to the foundations that Vargas laid down. The role of 
conservatives can be identified as being rather transitory reformist intermez- 
zos, which were nonetheless  powerful  enough to reform and strengthen the 
interventionist  model  without  being  able to transform  it into a free market 
one. This is where the controversy about the role of those reformist intermez- 
zos is centered. There is still much confusion between the liberal intentions of 
the so-called reformists and the effective results of their policies, which were 
not able to revert  the  main structure of state interventionism inherited  from 
the Vargas period. 
5. Liberal is employed in this essay in the radical sense of  political liberalism in the European 
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It  is through  those  episodes of  economic  rationality  that the old regime 
managed to survive until the 1980s, showing a fairly good economic perform- 
ance, although increasingly inflationary, for most of those three decades. The 
first reformist intermezzo took place in the short period of eight months be- 
tween August 1954 and April  1955, when Eugenio Gudin, a lonely liberal, 
took office at the Ministry of Finance. The second intermezzo lasted longer: 
that  was  between  April  1964  and  March  1967,  when  the  team  Roberto 
Campos-Octavio  Bulhdes  conducted  the  Brazilian  economy  under the  first 
military period after Vargas. General Castelo Branco was the President. De- 
spite every reasonable  doubt, we  may  refer  to a third intermezzo between 
February  1983 and November  1984, when the team led by Delfim Netto fi- 
nally gave in to the international evidence and adjusted the country’s balance 
of payments following the 1983 exchange devaluation. 
During the first reformist intermezzo, Gudin brought about a tightening of 
monetary  controls  during the  short period  he stayed in  office: the  average 
monthly expansion of M1, in Gudin’s period, was 1.44%, as compared to the 
2.86%  monthly growth in the preceding period, while the monthly  inflation 
rates dropped from an average of 1.95%  to 0.94%.6  His intentions, however, 
were actually centered on a free exchange market that he envisaged for the 
country. Whether or not he realized it, he attacked the interventionist model at 
its most important pillar: the official control of the exchange rate. Of course, 
he was never able to accomplish his goal. He did, however, manage to pass 
Instruction no.  113, which permitted the import of investment goods without 
exchange coverage.  That amounted, in other words,  to enable importers of 
industrial equipment-Brazilians  and foreign  firms-to  update their plants 
and even install new ones at an effective exchange rate that was neither the 
official nor the black market one.’ 
What followed Gudin’s brief stay as Minister of Finance was a very inter- 
esting experience in terms of our definition of populism: the Juscelino Kubit- 
schek administration (1  956-60). Kubitschek’s concern with development was 
explicitly embodied in his Targets Program. This was not a global planning of 
the economy. It did not cover all basic industries. Investments in infrastructure 
were directed to eliminate bottlenecks,  and, in many cases, projects that had 
been  prepared  by the earlier  Brazil-USA  Commission (195  1-53)  were then 
used. In terms of  basic industries, the objective was to give incentives to sec- 
tors such as metallurgy,  cement, chemicals,  heavy mechanics,  shipbuilding, 
and the automobile industry. He built a new capital-Brasilia-as  a symbol 
of  his government.8 He wisely took advantage of Gudin’s Instruction no. 113, 
which  gave  an  incentive  for foreign  companies  to invest  in  Brazil.  In the 
1956-60 period the Brazilian economy achieved high growth rates. The coun- 
try’s GDP expanded 8% a year, on average. This was the result of a policy of 
6.  Fur an account of Gudin as a finance minister, see Bulhbes (1979, pp. 79-89). 
7. On Gudin’s views on exchange rate policy, see Gudin (1978a, pp. 84-87,  107-8). 
8. For an examination of Kubitschek’s Target Plan, see Lessa (1983, pp. 27-91)  and Benevides 
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industrialization at any cost, protected by heavy custom duties and currency 
exchange incentives and large public investments. However, in  1958, the in- 
flationary pressures were evident,  and the government  made an  attempt to 
stabilize the economy under the command of Lucas Lopes and Roberto Cam- 
pos. The government, however, soon abandoned the program and had to break 
up with the IMF (see Skidmore 1976, 218-19). 
Kubitschek’s economic policies were certainly expansionary. His political 
target was to make Brazil’s “50 years in five.” He drove close to a balance of 
payments crisis and publicly rejected the IMF’s recipe when the international 
community tried to make him swallow it. Was he a populist? If so it was not 
because of those actions. Although the economic repercussions of his period 
may have led to some public discontent and political instability, Kubitschek’s 
performance was clearly democratic. His mandate was a regular one, and he 
handed over the presidency to the man who had opposed him fiercely during 
the  1960 campaign. His economic targets were set in the long run and cer- 
tainly provoked short-run imbalances, which horrified some conservatives. 
But they were never placed in the direction of acquiring or maintaining some 
form of authoritarian power.9 
The same cannot be said with such assurance about the two presidents who 
came into power after Kubitschek. Jinio Quadros, the first of the two, was a 
champion of popularity at the time he was elected. He could deal with the 
passion of  the masses in a way that had not been seen in Brazilian politics 
since Vargas. 
However, following a very short period of eight months in office, Quadros 
abruptly handed his resignation to Congress. Historians argue that his actual 
intention was to be reinstated “in the arms of the people” with enough power 
to carry out the “reforms” that had been constantly obstructed by a reactionary 
Congress. But the people remained apathetic. The elements of discontent and 
of political instability were right there. What ensued can be traced back to the 
old Vargas style of populism and was enacted by none other than his closest 
political heir, who happened to be right on the scene: incumbent vice president 
Joio Goulart. 
For the first time, the populist group that stepped in did not know enough 
about the limits of the fiscal budget and the exchange reserves. The political 
attitudes  were  “revolutionary”-which  shook  the  conservative  minds  that 
were already used to populist manipulations-enough  to placate the people’s 
discontent but not to the point of letting the government believe in them. That 
single experience of populism under a leftist influence in Brazil clearly shows 
us the central difference between classic populism and the variant form carried 
out by  “well-intentioned”  leftists. The difference is that the latter does not 
know the limits of the balance of payments.’O The features of Goulart’s popu- 
9. This view is shared by Benevides (1979). 
10. For an  account of  the economic policies undertaken in this period, see Skidmore (1976, pp. 
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lism fit nicely into the description of a conventional mishandling of economic 
tools. 
The most important lesson to be drawn from the Goulart period is that his 
populism did not have to be the way it came out. There is no evidence of any 
particularly serious deterioration of  the Brazilian terms of trade, as often al- 
leged  by  “structuralists”  during that time, or any domestic setback such as 
that brought about by a bad crop.II It is also quite worth observing that leftist 
populism is infinitely less efficient than the classic one in terms of overtaking 
and keeping authoritarian power. Eventually, JoCo Goulart and his group were 
all overthrown by a military coup supported by the conservative elite, an act 
easily accepted  by  the  public  opinion. Thus the economic  heritage  of  that 
period is rather poor in the sense that leftist populism was not able to project 
its impact into the future by means of lasting institutions. 
After Goulart’s departure, in April 1964, the Castelo Branco administration 
( 1964-67)  formulated a short-run  policy  program  (Government  Economic 
Operation  Program, or PAEG),  whose main  goals were  to control inflation 
and correct the distortions inherited from state intervention  in the economy. 
Severe measures were adopted, such as cuts in government expenditures, the 
elimination of subsidies, a squeeze in private credit, and wage controls. The 
new  administration  also carried  out a successful tax reform, which  greatly 
increased tax revenues.  Iz 
The crucial  aspect of  this period is the objectives that were not achieved 
rather than the ones that were eventually reached. The frustration of certain 
goals represents the dividing line between conservatism and liberalism in Bra- 
zil. The latter was never experienced at any time. Conservatism, on the other 
hand,  is a form of political  conduct  that  will  not reject certain means em- 
ployed by populists. In that sense, although it cannot be said that classic pop- 
ulism ensued from the second reformist intermezzo, it is certainly not wrong 
to say that conservatism inherited from populism some important characteris- 
tics, namely, the official doctrine of “security and development,” according to 
which the maintenance of authoritarian power is justified to the extent that the 
government’s economic performance is successful. This aspect would become 
very  clear later,  under the  Medici  period,  when  the  interventionist  model 
reached its “golden age.” 
During  Castelo Branco’s  administration,  there  were  a number  of  liberal 
ideas that unfortunately were not carried out. The first was that of an indepen- 
dent Central Bank. The legislation was actually produced, but the facts over- 
rode the ink on the paper. Soon after Castelo Branco left in 1967, the Central 
Bank had a confrontation with General Costa e Silva who had succeeded Cas- 
telo Branco; the final result goes without saying. 
I  I. On CEPAL’s structuralist view, see Campos (1979, pp. 142-48). 
12. A summary of Castelo Branco’s economic policies can be found in Simonsen (1974, pp. 
39-40).  For a more detailed account, see Skidmore (1988, pp. 68-77,  116-17) and Viana Filho 
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The second important point relates to the exchange rate liberalization. Rob- 
erto Campos, the planning minister, tried to  free it, but again the “national 
interests” prevented the continuation of that experiment. A third area of con- 
flict relates to the procedure used to set the prices of public utilities and of oil 
by-products, in particular. The price-setting process has never been made flex- 
ible. Despite Campos’ firm attempts to break those monopolies, the bureauc- 
racy would not renounce the right to intervene to equalize regional differences 
and impose an income policy through strategic prices. 
That second intermezzo, however successful it was in protracting the life of 
the interventionist structure, could never achieve its reversal toward the free 
market as long as it remained under conservative influence, to the silent frus- 
tration of the liberal architects, Campos and Bulhbes, who would have liked 
to reverse that model entirely. In hindsight, the times were not ripe for that 
change. Another three decades would have to pass in order to achieve that 
transformation. 
Right after the Camps-Bulhks team,  the paulisrus took over under the 
firm leadership of Antbnio Delfim Netto during Costa e Silva’s and MCdici’s 
governments (1968-73).  Delfim’s greatest merits lie in the fact that he man- 
aged to neutralize the exchange rate deadlock by  introducing crawling peg 
devaluations. In so doing, during a period of  continuous expansion of world 
trade, he managed to ride the wave of progress by driving the Brazilian indus- 
try  toward exports as a complement to the growing domestic market. The 
1968-73  period contrasts with the years of  economic slowdown, 1962-67. 
The Brazilian GDP grew at  an average of  10% a year. 
On the sinful side, Delfim Netto must take the blame for the legislation that 
erased the servicing of internal debt from the Treasury’s budget, thus letting 
the rollover of domestic debt fall under the responsibility of the Central Bank. 
That  was  the  beginning of  endogenous money  creation in  Brazil,  which, 
coupled to indexation, finally led to the hyperinflationary bias that is borne by 
the economy today. Another negative outcome of  this period was the expan- 
sion of the productive activities of  the public sector.I3  Despite the investment 
of  state companies being one big source of growth in the 1968-73 period, the 
majority of state corporations were not operated under efficiency criteria, and, 
as a consequence, their investments resulted in low capital productivity, which 
would negatively affect the potential growth of the economy later on.  I4 
In  1973, when the oil crisis broke out, Delfim avoided an exchange deval- 
uation. After he stepped down, the economy came into the hands of  Mario 
Henrique Simonsen, whose elbow room for reform was quite narrow given 
the political style of the new president, Ernest0 Geisel. After 1973, the Geisel 
13. For an account of Delfirn Netto’s policies, see Skidmore (1988, pp.  181-89,  274-86)  and 
Baer (1983, pp. 242-45). 
14. The various negative effects of the state’s intervention in the economy during this period are 
discussed in Martone (1985) and Suzigan (1988). The expansion of state companies is also well 
documented and criticized in Gudin (1978a, pp. 405-37;  1978b, pp. 261-82). 163  Sixty Years of Populism in Brazil 
administration (1974-79)  sought a policy of accommodation in order to pre- 
serve real GNP at the expense of a rise in inflation. The government undertook 
an ambitious investment program with its state companies after 1975, which 
reached its peak in  1979. This program was mainly directed toward the pro- 
duction of energy (the building of power plants, oil mining, and the produc- 
tion of alcohol as an alternative fuel) and a second round of import substitu- 
tion (heavy engineering, fertilizers, and metallurgy of nonferrous metals). In 
order to finance this program it was necessary to borrow heavily both from 
abroad and in the domestic market. The government’s deficit as a percentage 
of  GDP grew from  1.4% in  1974 to  13.1% in  1979 (see Marques  1985, 
p. 361). Inflation rose from 15% a year in  1973 to 40% in 1979. In spite of 
the visible effects of the oil crisis, the Geisel administration simply did every- 
thing to avoid a real devaluation.  l5 
This period of  a “stepped-up march” revived old aspects of  classic popu- 
lism.I6  The main figure of  the popular ruler was not there, but the interven- 
tionist policies to secure the dominance of the state certainly were. Geisel had 
been close to Vargas since the beginning. His presence in the Brazilian politics 
dates back to the lieutenants’ time in the 1920s. He had been one of them. His 
policies could not be much different. So, it has to be reckoned that a mix of 
conservatism and populism were again present in that period. The military, as 
a whole, acted as a searching authoritarian power, although not  any one of 
them in particular. 
In  1979, the Figueiredo administration (1979-84)  was faced with: a huge 
external debt, the servicing of which consumed 67% of export revenues; the 
second oil crisis, as a consequence of the Iranian situation; and the impact of 
rising interest rates. In December 1979 the government adopted the following 
measures to cope with the increasing disorder in the economy: it put in place 
a 30% devaluation; it eliminated many tax exemptions; it increased tariffs of 
public services; it reduced the tax on interest sent abroad from 12.5% to 1.5% 
to stimulate borrowing from abroad; and it introduced a new wage bill, which 
reduced the period of adjusting wages from one year to six months. However, 
right after announcing these measures, early in 1980  the government made the 
fatal mistake of fixing beforehand the exchange rate devaluation for the whole 
year at 40% and indexing contracts at a limit of  45%. It also strengthened 
price controls. The government also planned to limit credit expansion to 45% 
for that year (see Baer 1983, pp. 414-15).  However, actual credit expansion 
was a great deal above the target (79%), the wage bill contributed to increased 
industrial costs, and price controls were not effective. As a consequence of 
this boost of aggregate real demand, GDP grew 7.9% and inflation rose from 
77% in the previous year to 110% in  1980. The improvement in export com- 
15. Alternatives to  devaluation were a 100% compulsory deposit on imports, and fiscal and 
16. The expression, “stepped-up  march,” was coined by AntBnio Barros de Castro (1985) in his 
credit subsidies to exports. 
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petitiveness due to the devaluation that had occurred in December  1979 was 
completely lost, because the prefixed devaluation fell short of inflation during 
1980 (Baer 1983, p. 417). 
After the disastrous experience of  1980, a third reforming intermezzo be- 
gan. Figueiredo  changed  course  toward  more orthodox  policies.  Monetary 
policy was tightened in 198  1, and, after the outbreak of the international debt 
crisis in 1982, the exchange rate was devalued again by 30% in February 1983 
while a new wage bill was passed in order to control wage increases. Agree- 
ments with the IMF were signed, but all too often the targets for public deficits 
and monetary expansion were missed. Figueiredo succeeded in balancing the 
external  accounts, raising  international  reserves,  and  cutting  subsidies  and 
government  expenditures, and  inflation  nevertheless  leveled  off  at 200%  a 
year. 
The third intermezzo only started making sense in  1983, through  the ex- 
change devaluation carried out by Delfim Netto, the same man who would not 
do it  10 years before, at the beginning of the first oil crisis. This third inter- 
mezzo, under a very clear conservative influence, was just enough to keep the 
country’s finances afloat until the November presidential elections of  1984. 
Summing up, the macroeconomic indicators (see table 6.1) show that there 
were two periods of fast growth, namely  the Kubitschek and Medici-Geisel 
periods after 1954, when the average growth rates of real GDP were 8% and 
9% a year, respectively. These two periods were preceded by reforming inter- 
mezzos-Gudin’s  and Campos-Bulh6es’s-which  checked inflation and ex- 
ternal imbalances. After 1978, however, the growth and inflation performance 
became increasingly poorer. In Figueiredo’s period, the GDP average growth 
fell to 2%  a year and inflation rose to 120% a year on average. The picture we 
get from the whole  1954-84  period  is clearly one of an economy under in- 
creasing  strain,  with  growing  inflation,  external  imbalances,  and  falling 
growth  rates.  The  interventionist  model  inherited  from  Vargas  gradually 
shows all its damaging effects on the economy. The reforming  intermezzos 
stretched the model’s life without managing to alter its regulatory nature. 
6.4  Notes on Aging Populism: 1985-90 
Both conservatives and populists have taken advantage of the intervention- 
ist model created and developed by Vargas’s heritage. Both of them have used 
the  means  of an authoritarian  power to control the economy  and affect the 
market forces to the benefit of their distributive purposes.  Through different 
policies, conservatives and populists have showed evidence of their disbelief 
in market forces as a correct way to achieve higher productivity, better wages, 
and fairer distribution of  income and wealth.  We  cannot seriously  deny the 
fact that they have almost operated together during the last three decades of 
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This apparently contradictory picture became clear after the uberturu.  By 
1984, the opposition was ready to take over the power from the army. So they 
acted with Tancredo Neves-an  aging moderate politician-who  died before 
his inauguration. JosC  Sarney, an odd vice president of a last-minute political 
coalition, took over in Tancredo’s place. 
Through his five years  in  office,  Sarney  was  a  political  hostage  of  the 
groups from which he had borrowed support. His team was not settled; he had 
to negotiate it. A new constitution (1988) was to be written up. Such a politi- 
cal set up, permeated by discontent and instability provided fertile soil for the 
resurgence of populism. 
In what sense does populism in the 1980s differ from classic populism? The 
answer is that classic populism in Brazil was so well absorbed by the ruling 
elite that it could be identified, through the  1960s and 1970s, with the con- 
servatives rather than with the so-called leftists or “progressivists.” In fact, the 
conservatives have tried to preserve (i.e., to conserve) the existing structure 
of the interventionist model laid out by Vargas. That model had been a “mira- 
cle worker” for Brazil for so many years that the ruling elite developed  all 
sorts of vested~interests  around it. Even when the model began to falter, they 
clung to it, through  an authoritarian coup (1964), which led to 20 years of 
military rule. 
Therefore, the opposition to the conservatives was concentrated in the po- 
litical sector, that is, against the military in power, but not against the inter- 
ventionist  model that both conservatives and populists actually upheld. This 
is precisely the reason why very little was turned upside down when the “pro- 
gressivists” took over after 1984. Under a representative regime-democracy 
in  political  terms-the  interventionist  model  was  not  denounced  but  rein- 
forced. 
Throughout his mandate,  President Sarney let aging populism prevail and 
dominate economic policies. The difference between classic and aging popu- 
lism  lies in the degree of  proficiency  in manipulating economic tools.  The 
former is much more efficient than the latter. Aging populism tends to resort 
to extensive controls of  the economy  that eventually  produce very  few per- 
manent effects but do create dramatic  consequences  in terms of macroeco- 
nomic imbalances (see table 6.1). 
Sarney attempted three stabilization programs without any success because 
these programs  tried to cope with  the symptoms of  the collapsing interven- 
tionist model rather than to focus on structural reform. One aspect common to 
all these policy experiments  was their overinterventionism,  in complete dis- 
regard of the markets. 
17. Aberfura,  the Brazilian equivalent to  glusnosr, took place after 1979 and culminated with 
elections on 15 November 1984, when the opposition candidate, Tancredo Neves, was the winner. 
He had been minister of justice  in Getulio Vargas’s last cabinet. As  a young politician then, he 
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All programs were based on two main ideas borrowed from a wide spec- 
trum of academic economists, ranging from the left to the right: the “inertial 
inflation” and the “external debt-stagnation’’ hypothesis. The former argues 
that tight fiscal and monetary policies would have little effect upon inflation, 
leading only to a protracted recession.l*  The latter says that, in order to service 
the external debt, the debtor country is forced to transfer resources abroad that 
otherwise could be  used to foster domestic investment and growth. On  the 
other hand, as the country must run a trade surplus to finance its external debt 
service, it is necessary to restrain domestic demand and accelerate real deval- 
uations of the exchange rate, actions that cause both stagnation and inflation. 
Both hypotheses proved to be thoroughly wrong.  l9 
Nevertheless, these “theories” gave good excuses for a weak  government 
not to control its public deficit and the money supply and deregulate the econ- 
omy. It is not surprising, therefore, that the political coalition of conservatives 
and leftists eagerly carried out the policy recommendations of  those “theo- 
ries”: wage and price controls to break the price inertia and nonpayment of 
interest on external debt. They were both popular and both bypassed painful 
structural adjustments. 
The first stabilization attempt, the Cruzado Plan (28 February 1986), led by 
the messianic Dilson Funaro, the late finance minister who froze wages and 
prices and declared there would be no public deficit. There was  a massive 
monetary expansion to cover the public deficit and buy back domestic public 
debt. Six months later, despite all of  Funaro’s patriotic efforts, the inflation 
rate showed its nasty face again and the external balance deteriorated. Never- 
theless, the political gains, in the short run, were huge: the governing coali- 
tion managed to elect most of the state governors and a large number of seats 
in the Congress in the November 1986 elections. By early 1987, all popular 
support for the Samey government had  faded away. Then, the government 
blamed the “external debt” for all its problems and declared a moratorium 
without any results. The default of external debt received no popular support. 
Bresser Pereira was then called in to substitute for Funaro. He carried out 
the second stabilization program, the so-called Bresser Plan (12 June 1987). 
Again wages and prices were frozen, and external debt was  blamed for all 
problems.  Bresser,  a  pragmatic economist, attempted both  to  control the 
public-sector deficit and to reach an agreement with external creditors. How- 
ever meritorious his efforts were, he lacked the political support necessary to 
carry out his plan. More important, his mistaken assessment of  the Brazilian 
18. For an explanation of the inertial hypothesis of  inflation, see Lopes (1984) and Simonsen 
(1986). The inertial hypothesis of Brazilian inflation has been challenged by various  authors (e.g., 
Ronci 1988). 
19. For a more detailed argument on the debt-stagnation hypothesis, see Bacha (1988),  Cardoso 
and Dornbusch (1989), and Sachs (1987). For a critical examination of the external-debt hypoth- 
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economic crisis led to more intervention in the markets without addressing the 
more fundamental issue of structural reform. 
In  1988, Mailson da Nobrega, a career civil servant, took over the Ministry 
of  Finance. Initially, da Nobrega tried to control the public deficit, without 
success, on a day-by-day basis (“rice and beans policy”) and then yielded to 
political pressure by freezing wages and prices once more as well as delaying 
the interest payments on external debt (the Summer Plan, January 1989). The 
effects of this plan were again short-lived: inflation rates went down the first 
three months and then rose to a 30% level and then moved upward. 
Ail three attempts were basically flawed in both their diagnosis of the eco- 
nomic crisis and their solutions for it. The crisis stemmed from the inherited 
interventionist model. First, the excessive intervention in the markets was the 
true cause of growth stagnation rather than the burden of external debt in the 
1980s. Government intervention through subsidizing certain activities, exces- 
sive regulation, subsidized interest rates to certain sectors, and the protection 
of domestic industry from foreign competition has stimulated a large number 
of low productive investments. The private sector in Brazil has received dis- 
torted signals from interest rates and relative prices, investing in  sectors or 
regions where the return on capital was low. On the other hand, from the mid- 
seventies onward the government has substantially  expanded its role as a pro- 
ducer of goods and services. As the majority of state corporations were inef- 
ficient, a good deal of their investments also resulted in low capital productiv- 
ity.  Finally the growth of  the  so-called entrepreneurial state also led to  a 
decline of investments in health and education. The low quality of health and 
education has resulted in low productivity of  labor and has sustained a per- 
verse income distribution (see Martone 1985 and Suzigan 1988). 
Second, institutional underdevelopment has led the Central Bank to cover 
the public-sector deficit by printing money and restricting its freedom to pur- 
sue an independent monetary policy to fight inflation.20  Without a stable cur- 
rency, the Tanzi effect operates against budget equilibrium. Internal debt pil- 
ing sets in. As public finances deteriorates, credibility is affected and capital 
flight increases. 
6.5  Concluding Remarks 
The main points of this present essay are: 
1. Politicians do not undertake populist actions simply in response to social 
pressures. The populist leader carries out careful political calculations of his 
actions and uses economic and noneconomic tools as a means to reach his 
objectives, which are to seize and keep power in an authoritarian fashion. 
2. We  cannot identify economic failures as always associated with populist 
20. For a detailed examination of the Brazilian Central Bank, see Brandao (1989). 168  Paulo Rabello de Castro and Marcio Ronci 
policies. Therefore, the concept of  economic populism becomes meaningless 
for policy identification. 
3. The main feature of  populism  is the institutional underdevelopment it 
provokes.  Populism  hates limits to the ruler’s power that sound institutions 
would otherwise bring about. As a consequence, the countries that experience 
populism do not have strong institutions,  like an independent Central Bank, 
an active Supreme Court, or a democratically elected Congress. 
4. Regarding  Brazilian history,  Vargas’s classic populism understood that 
the economy had to be run within the limits of financial constraints. In gen- 
eral, classic populism managed the economy quite well in the short run. How- 
ever,  it  laid  down  the foundations  of  an  interventionist  model-excessive 
regulation of the economy and the expansion of the state as an entrepreneur- 
which  distorted  the allocation  of resources  and negatively  affected  Brazil’s 
potential output. 
5. All the events of  the three decades  after  1954 can be interpreted as a 
sequential attempt to cope with the long-run problems generated by the inter- 
ventionist  model inherited from Vargas. Brief intervals of conservative  eco- 
nomic  policies-indeed,  reformist  intermezzos-extended  the  life span of 
the model, but could not avoid its degeneration. Economic performance even- 
tually collapsed regardless of the strengthening of controls over the economy. 
6. Populism is an aging phenomenon in Brazil. 
Is there an alternative to populism? We hold the view that liberalism can 
offer a way out of the predicament of most Latin American countries. But how 
can liberal formulas become “popular”? Maybe they do not have to. What has 
to become popular is the idea of democracy. This is the basic prerequisite for 
the growth of liberalism as a form of economic policy-making. From an evo- 
lutionary viewpoint, the time seems ripe for liberalization in Brazil. It will not 
come, however, through any rational decision of  the elite but through various 
pressure elements stemming from the basis of the economic system. 
Appendix A 
Sources of Data for Table 6.1 
Column I .-Real  gross domestic product (GDP) growth for the 1930-70  pe- 
riod  was obtained  from Estutisticu Histdricus  do Brasil  (1987, p.  94) pub- 
lished  by  the  Brazilian  Institute of  Geography  and Statistics  (IBGE). Real 
GDP growth for the 1980-89  period was obtained from the National Account 
Department of the IBGE. 
Column 2.  -The  nominal wage  index for the urban  sector of  the center- 
south region during the 1945-77  period was obtained from Goldsmith (1986, 
pp. 239 and 347). The nominal wage index for the manufacturing sector of 169  Sixty Years  of Populism in Brazil 
SBo Paulo State in the  1977-89  period was obtained from the FIESP index 
reported in Conjuntura EconGmica, various issues. 
Column 3.-Inflation  was measured by  the annual variation of  the GDP 
deflator. For the 1930-80  period, it was found in Estatisticas  Histdricas  do 
Brasil (1987, pp.  11-1  12, 159). For the 1980-89 period, it was obtained from 
the National Account Department of the IBGE. 
Columns  4 and 5.-Here,  M1 is defined as currency plus deposit accounts, 
and M2 is defined as M1 plus time deposits. Money figures are annual average 
balance variations. Data for the 1930-80 period was obtained from Estatisti- 
cas Histdricas do Brasil(l987,  p. 492-93,  503-5).  For the 1980-89 period, 
it was obtained from the Central Bank of Brazil. 
Columns 6 and 7.  -Trade  and current accounts in million of dollars for the 
1930-80 period were obtained from Estatistica Historicas Brasileiras  ( 1987, 
p. 535-39)  and for the 1980-89 period from Conjuntura EconGmica, various 
issues. In order to calculate their shares of GDP, it was necessary to generate 
a series of GDP in dollars. First, we calculated the real GDP in billion of U.S. 
dollars using the IBGE estimate of GDP in 1988-$350  billion-and  the real 
growth rates of GDP. Having done that, we inflated the real GDP series using 
the producer price index for the United States as reported in Main Economic 
Indicators of OECD. various issues. Appendix B 
Table 6B.1  Macroeconomic Data of  the Brazilian Economy 
Money 
Real GDP  Nominal Wages  Inflation, GDP  M1  M2  Trade Balance  Current Account  Exchange Rate 
Year  (I  Variation)  (% Variation)  Deflator (annual %)  (annual %)  (annual %)  (% GDP)  (% GDP)  (annual %) 
1930  -2.1  ...  -  12.36  ...  ...  7.5  -6.3  ... 
1931  -3.3  ...  -  10.87  -  .83  .03  12.4  .4  46.1 
1932  4.3  ...  1.56  12.68  3.95  9.0  2.5  -  .7 
1933  8.9  ...  -  2.04  15.20  6.88  6.4  1.3  -  6.0 
1934  9.2  ...  6.26  7.24  2.59  8.1  2.3  17.5 
1935  2.9  ...  4.79  6.17  8.08  5.0  -2.2  16.9 
1936  12.1  ...  1.64  7.79  9.21  7.4  .6  -  1.2 
1937  4.6  ...  9.45  7.02  9.16  3.6  -3.4  -5.9 
1938  4.5  ...  3.16  14.73  10.29  2.7  .2  9.4 
1939  2.5  ...  2.04  17.72  15.39  4.5  1.6  9.5 
1940  -1.1  ...  6.70  -4.13  5.04  2.8  -  .7  2.1 
1941  5 .O  ...  10.22  3.92  8.12  6.8  4.3  I .5 
I942  -2.1  ...  16.24  23.66  22.41  9.9  8.6  .o 
1943  8.5  ...  16.61  28.68  25.76  9.1  7.4  .o 
1944  7.6  ...  20.64  41.82  39.56  9.2  6.3  .o 
1945  3.2  ...  14.92  35.16  34.32  10.8  7.8  .o 
1946  11.8  ...  14.57  13.90  15.70  9.8  4.7  .o 
1947  2.3  ...  9.04  13.57  10.04  2.6  -  3.0  14.7 
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